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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The a irplane is a liberating force- a force that released man from
his earthly tether and helped ease the demands of time and
distance. Thanks to this machine, mountains, oceans, and vast
stretches of desert, which man had previously traversed with timecon suming effort and often at his peril, today are daily conquered
with speed, ease, and safety. Yet, though a liberating influence,
the a irplane is itself a highly dependent machine. In order to serve
man's purposes safely and efficiently, it must operate in a
controlled and regulated environment, and requires th e support of
a far-flung and complex ground organization to monitor and direct
virtually its every move. I
Amidst the disturbing aftermath of September 11, 2001, the aviation
industry is struggling to find a way to secure air travel in a world wrought with
terrorist bombers, hijackers, and the like with one goal being to intimidate,
subjugate, and demoralize innocent people around the world. 2 Ensuring
security and safety within a society is a daunting task, especially, in a free
society, like that of the United States, where personal freedoms are the
foundation of the nation. Regardless of your p erson al interpretation of the
definition of freedom, t h e citizen ry of the United States has historically reviled
subjugation, intimidation, and demoralization of its people.
From Orville and Wilbur Wright's humble avia tion beginnings, the
United States has created one of t h e most complex, federally regulated
industries in the history of mankind, calling into question the fine line that lies
between security and personal safety and impingement of our personal
liberties.
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What lies before the aviation industry is maintaining the balance
between securing the nation 's air travel system without infringing upon the
rights of individuals within the nation. There can be no doubt that after
September 11, 2001, a degree of the liberties that up until that fateful day most
people took for granted have been lost-to what degree has yet to be established.
Thomas Jefferson said the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. Perhaps,
Americans have been in a deep sleep for a long time. Like Washington Irving's
Rip Van Winkle, the United States, in p a rticular those agencies charged with
securing the aviation industry, fell into a slumber and awoke to a changed
society.
The purpose of this backgrounder is to examine the evolution of security
regulations within the aviation industry.3 Why are things the way they are
today? How did we get to a place where the FAA, within t he Department of
Transportation, fa iled in its efforts to provide the s ecurity outlined in its 2001
strategic plan? Was it a lack of technological progress, lack of leadership, or
lack of funding? What h ave we lea rned from the changes within the nation's
security plan and wh ere do we go from here?
This b ackgrounder will h elp uncover the answers to the quest ions above
by presenting the facts about the evolution of aviation and the regulations
within the industry. The monstrous regulatory infrastructure that undergirds
this industry will immedia tely b ecom e apparent to the reader, along with the
necessity of these regulatory measures created to provide development and
safety, and ultima tely security. After looking at the legislative evolution of
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aviation, the reader will deduce that the aviation agencies historically react to
crises by increasing their size and scope of responsibility. This historical trend
indicates, with the events of September 11 th, that government intervention in
our lives is likely to become increasingly more invasive.

2.0 AVIATION BEGINNINGS
Looking back to the infancy of aviation in 1903, the indifference by most people
within the nation to the possibilities of this new form of transportation is
remarkable. With many unsuccessful a ttempts of flight recorded, the Wright
brother's accomplishments on December 17th went virtually unnoticed because
past aviators and their failures produced a skeptical press. While most people
in the United States saw Wilbur and Orville's twelve-second flight as an
awesome accomplishment, few saw the practical potential hidden within the
airplane in the sky. The technology of flight established in December of 1903
by the Wright Brothers gave birth to aviation and the complex task of
regulating the industry through its infancy and future growth.

2.1 Orville and Wilbur's Experiments

)•

Atop Kill Devil Hill, n ear the village of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on a
morning in 1903, Orville and Wilbur Wright tested their flying machine, Flyer I.
The inclement weather conditions that day m ade their experiment perilous, if
not impossible. Nevertheless, the aviators managed to keep Flyer I in the air
for twelve seconds, which put the flight into the history books as the first-ever
"sustained, piloted flight." 4 After another attempt on the same day, the Wright
brothers broke their own record "by sustaining flight for 59 seconds."S

f
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However, it was Wilbur's flight, while in Europe in 1908, of two hours a nd
twenty minutes that brought recognition for their flying accomplishments.6
The Wright Brothers interest in man in flight all began with an article
published in McClure 's Magazine, September 1894, about a man n amed Otto
Lilenthal a nd his m an carrying glide rs .7 While many years passed from this
initial article to their infamous flight, the spark ignited within the brothers by
this story smoldered within them for five years.
The profundity of their experiments can never be overestimated. Wilbur
and Orville began their investigation into the possibility of man in flight on May
30, 1899, with a letter from Wilbur to the Smithsonian Institute explaining his
interest in huma n flight a nd his belief that the experiments and research of
"independent workers" would ultimately result in the "accumulation of
information and knowledge and skill which [would) finally lea d to accomplished
flight."8 Wilbur requested all the publications t h e Smithsonian had at the time
p erta ining to the subject of avia tion.
The assistant secretary of the Institution, Rich a rd Rathbun, sent a list of
publications concerning aerial n avigation. These were: Progress in Flying

Machines, by Octave Ch a nute (1894, New York); Experiments in Aerodynamics,
by Samuel P . Langley (189 1, Washington); and The Aeronautical Annual for
1895, 1896, 1897, edited by J ames Means (1 895- 1897, Boston.) The

l'

Smithsonian packet also included pamphlets entitled: Empire of the Air, by
Louis-Pie rre Mouillard (No. 903); The Problem of Flying and Practical

Experiments in Soaring, by Otto Lilie nthal (938); Story of Experim ents in

_
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Mechanical Flight, By Samuel P. La n gley (No.11 34); and On Soaring Flight, by

E.C. Huffaker (No. 11 35.)9
The amount of aviation informa tion available to the brothers was a
pleasant surprise. Using these publications a nd Orville and Wilbur's superior
aptitudes in math a nd science as their starting points, the Wright brothers
systematica lly examined a ll past experiments for positive accomplishments in
the effort toward human flight.
By studying the birds in the air, the Wright's established that there were
two types of birds, those that flapped their wings to stay airborne, like the b a rn
swallow, and those that glided on invisible air currents holding their wings
stationary, like the eagle. It was the latter that man could hope to emulate, not
the former because of the technological intricacies needed to create moving
wmgs.
One of the reasons t h e Wrigh t's were successful in their experiments is
that they discovered there was a three-dimensional control system n eeded for
su ccessful flight 10. This system, known as the XYZ factor, also explained as
pitch , yaw, and roll, was a critical element in the ultimate success of the

/•
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Wright brothers. Earlier exp eriments by others did not discover this until it was
too late. It seem ed that k eeping the a ircraft a loft was not the only problem
with flight; keeping t h e aircraft level due to the wind effect on the wings was of
critical importance in m aintaining control of the aircraft. The wind made it
necessary for the pilot to comp en sate the level of the a ircraft continuously.
"Newcomers to flight training almost always hear words that h ave b een

r
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repeated countless times: '"The toughest part of flying is to fly straight and
level. "'11 This illuminated another important factor to the Wright brothers.
Earlier experiments by others always led to fatal results. This not only
halted the experiments, but it robbed future experiments of valuable
information from those fatal flights-information that could prevent future
accidents. The Wright's saw this as an important lesson. They would use
models and unmanned gliders until they were confident in their knowledge of
the laws in the physics of flight before finally experimenting with man in flight.
This model of study was critical to their success.
From Orville and Wilbur's first flight, safety in air travel has been an
issue. Technological and engineering advances began after that first flight with
the Wright brothers leading the way. "Flight was only the name of the n ew and
powerful servant. For from this moment on, the face of the planet would
ch ange, and we would enter a new era and a new way of living." 12

2.2 Commercial Viability of Aviation
The technology of flight established in December of 1903 by the Wright
brothers gave birth to airplane manufacturing primarily for the aviation
enthusiasts' use at this time. Several years later, World War I created a
utilitarian purpose for the airplane, albeit, a destructive use, and a ircraft
manufacturing grew substantially during the war "force fed by military
procurement orders."l3 After the war, some of the surplus aircraft afforded
aviators and would-be aviators the opportunity to fly airplanes for a living. The
itinerant aviator took on the name "gypsy flier", and these men and their

(I
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aircraft transfused their spectators with reverence and veneration for their
heroic stunts in the sky. Afterwards, they would gather the brave of heart
among the crowds for 50-cent rides in their rickety, worn aircraft. Their
livelihood was meager because their machines were in disrepair, and their
profits often disappeared for replacement of parts on their aircraft. 14
The watershed period in aviation began after World War I with the
commercial efforts of advertising. The gypsy fliers began to use their machines
to advertise for politicians and products. They would use the undersides of the
fuselage and the wings for product placement. In January 1923, this
advertising evolved with the formation of the Skywriting Corporation of
America. 15 Skywriting techniques began in England in 1922 and quickly
spread to the United States.
This in turn, gave birth to yet another business that grew during this
period, and that was aerial photography. Newspapers and magazines initially
created the demand for aerial photographs because they were unique and
novel, but it was not long before companies appeared offering mapping and
surveying through aerial photography. The fact was that "for sheer speed and
fidelity to detail, aerial mapping was unrivaled"- evidenced by the fact that "in
1920, the entire city of New York was photographed in 69 minutes."16
Next, the U.S . Department of Agriculture began pioneering in crop
dusting. With the bollweevil as a real threat to cotton crops in Louisiana and
Mississippi, and ground machines producing slow results in effectively

,

removing this "scourge of the cotton fields", the U.S. Army provided aircraft

..
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and pilots for use in this entomology experiment.l 7 It was quickly decided that
the efforts in crop dusting were an enormous success, and this success
established crop dusting as a viable business.
Selective use for light cargo during the early years of aviation was the
precursor to today's commercial activity in the industry. These occasions were
rare and "depended on people with pronounced proclivities for conspicuous
consumption, and were in no way organized on a regular basis."l8 For
example, a Retail Ice Cream Dealers' Association chartered an aircraft, on a day
in 1920, to carry a container of ice cream from Cleveland to Washington, D.C.
for a banquet.

Some believe, however, that it was the business of contraband

that "'held up aviation's pants"' in the early years.l9 Prohibition encouraged
the aviation industry because it was a safe way to transport liquor without
detection due to lack of regulations.
Hollywood joined the efforts of promoting aviation and "capturing the
excitement of flight" by placing airplanes within many of their motion pictures,
such as: "Sky Highwayman", "Speed Girl", and "Broken Wing." The production
of a film entitled "Wings" received the "first Oscar ever presented by the Motion

i.r
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Picture Academy for best picture."20
Another use for aviation, which would later become today's scheduled
airline service, was the first scheduled air-passenger service, established in
January 1914 called the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line.2 1 The company
was in business for three months during the winter, where they "shuttled
people across 23 miles of water on a more or less regular basis"; although, once

..
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their northern customers moved back north for the remainder of the year, the
company went out of business, but not without proving the potential of airpassenger service. 22
By 1920, the business community began calling for government
intervention as necessary to promote aviation. The potential of the airplane
existed in the mind of the entrepreneurial businessman, but it was apparent by
this time that government intervention was necessary if aviation was to grow.
While government r egulations within the aviation industry did not exist neither
did government subsidies exist to help promote this new transportation mode.
Division existed as to whether the aviation industry needed federal
intervention.
The idea of subsidies was not a new one. The U.S. Post Office led the
way in the promotion of new forms of transportation through subsidies for
many years.

"The Post Office Department .. . has borne the responsibility of

uniting the country through the communications system of the mail."23 One of
the first signs of a federal presence across the country was that of postal roads.
These roads were often the most reliable passages between communities, and

i:r
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the people throughout the nation began to expect the Post Office to keep up
with the expansion of the country.24
Transportation technologies began with roads, then canals, and then
railroads-in fact, "the Post Office kept pace by placing the public mails on
stage lines, ships, and rail cars."2 5 By contracting with these carriers, the Post
Office efficiently delivered mail and at the same time, contributed to the

..
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development of new transportation technologies because of their payment for
services. 26
Concurrent with this form of subsidy as an expected way of business, the
highly politicized position of Postmaster General, at this time of Post World War
1 also benefited this young transportation business. "America entered a new
'
era in the ongoing relationship between business and government when in late
spring of 1918 the Post Office inaugurated the nation's first regularly
scheduled air mail service." 27 Congress and the Post Office saw the aviation
industry as one with enormous potential for increasing speed of delivery and
ultimately, aviation as a viable transportation resource.

3.0 NEED FOR REGULATION
After years of political posturing and failed effor ts by those within Congress
and t h e Post Office, the Air Mail Act of 1925, also known as the Kelly Act,
named after Congressman Clyde Kelly of Pennsylvania who introduced the bill,
was finally passed into law. This act "created the first successful airlines in
the United States and supplied the needed impetus to push Congress toward
the passage of n ecessary regulations of the industry."28 The delivery of mail via
air was now in the hands of the private sector. At the same time, the common
belief was that without government intervention in air safety, "a reliable,
trustworthy airline system simply could not exist .. .and without government
financial incentives, the a irlines could not survive." 29 The state of aeronautics
at this time and the inefficiencies of aircraft technologies necessitated some
form of government subsidy. The "chaos of laissez-faire in the air" was coming
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to an end with the United States Post Office leading the way in the development
of a safe and reliable aviation industry.3o
In the spring of 1918, the Post Office inaugurated "the nation's first
regularly scheduled air mail service" with the help of army pilots and aircraft.31
. By August of 1918, "the army withdrew, leaving the Post Office in complete
control of the operations, equipped with its own aircraft and pilots."32 The
United States was lagging behind "other industrial nations in the development
of commercial air-passenger transportation" in the first quarter of the twentieth
century. 33 Around the same time, the fixed-base operator (FBO), or former
gypsy flier, was a conspicuous source of passenger air service. While the
number of passengers carried by the FBO's was few, their operations were
growing in numbers, yet many young passenger air service companies that
formed from 1914-1925 met with economic disaster.
Clearly, the government with its air mail service was the number one
success story in aviation. "Despite setbacks that any p ioneering enterprise
would expect, the new u.s. -Air Mail Service quickly became a generally r eliable
service, completing an average of 91 percent of its flights." 34 The application
process for Post Office pilots required 500 flying hours, qualifying exams,
periodic medical exams, and aircraft inspections after each four-or-five hour
trip. Engines received an overhaul every 100 hours of service, and satisfying a
checklist of 180 items gave aircraft an airworthiness certification. The Post
Office employed "353 mechanics and mechanics' helpers to care for a fleet of 96
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aircraft."35 These criteria boasted a successful record in safety and efficien cy
for the Post Office's air m a il enterprise.
By May 15, 1920, a ir mail ser vice had spread as far as Omaha; however,
all schedules were flown during the day as "neither the aircraft nor routes were
equipped with m easures to allow for night and bad weath er flying ."36 The
army's experimental lighted a irway between Dayton and Columbus, Ohio was
used as a model "to light the entire transcontinental route ."37 The highpowered , revolving b eacon s designed by General Electric lighted t h e airfields at
every airport and emergency landing strip along t he Post Office route. By
1925, th e lighting of airfields across the transcontinental route saw its

com pletion at a cost of $550,000 leading to the promotion of commercial air
service expansion.38
From World Wa r I through 1925, aviation belonged in the "realm of the
thrillseeker", n ot as a safe mode of transpor tation.39 If aviation was to succeed,
government promotion, through regulating operations and offering incentives to
private con tractors, was essen tial. The term subsidy, often a detested term,
was palatable in the form of providing n avigation al aids, and President Hoover
cited the precedent of "federal assistance in the form of aid to shipping."40
Government regulations assign ed safety standards for personnel and
equipment for th e shipping industry a long with enforcement responsibilities.
Funding for improvements and development of waterways and ports supported
the government's r egulatory measures.
fl

-\1
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Prominent individuals appointed to a committee in June of 1925 by
President Hoover declared four issues facing aviation:
First, there was a lack of definite legal status and government control
over civil aviation. Second, an absence of an established government
policy to encourage the civilian and industrial uses of aircraft hampered
development. Third, there were at present no aircraft or supporting
equipment adapted to efficient and profitable commercial operation. This
resulted, fourth, in the lack of public and business confidence and
support. 41
The immediate enactment of a civil aeronautics law was recommended by the
committee, which would create a Bureau of Aeronautics within the Department
of Commerce. Hoover's initiatives, along with the passage of the Air Mail Act or
Kelly Act of 1925, created a symbiotic business-government bond that
continues to the present day.

3. 1 Pioneers in Aviation Promotion
From the early years of aviation until the Air Mail Act of 1925, the struggle in
the promotion of aviation was ongoing between civil and military aviation,
aviators, and politicians. Equally important at this time was the large
investment of capital by well known investors that legitimized the opportunity
that lay within the aviation industry. But once again, it was the Post Office
that led the way to a new era in aviation. This new development was largely
due to the efforts of Paul Henderson, the Second Assistant Postmaster General,
who took the Post Office into the future. He established a successful
transcontinental route for airmail, and "he worked closely with [Clyde] Kelly
and with interested business leaders in preparing for the day when the service
could be turned over to private interests."42 Henderson's preparations of

'I
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Whitney, among others. United Airlines, originally National Air Transport
(NAT), received capital from William A. Rockefeller, along with Philip K. Wrigley,
Lester Armour, C. F. Kettering, Marshall Field, and Robert P. Lamont. National
Air Transport successfully courted Mr. Paul Henderson, formerly the
Postmaster General, for a position as the airlines general manager.so
Airmail contracts went to Ford, NAT, and Colonial in the fall of 1925.
"Ford was awarded two mail routes: Detroit-Cleveland and Detroit-Chicago.
Colonial got the Boston-New York route; NAT, Chicago-Dallas."SI Additional
contracts came later with the introduction of the transcontinental route to
contract carriers.
William Boeing's, Boeing Airplane Company founded in 1917 in Seattle
Washington, served a major role in aircraft design and manufacturing for
military and naval contracts during World War I. After the Air Mail Act of
1925, Boeing entered into the air mail business with the formation of Boeing

Air Transport and a newly designed aircraft to handle up to twelve hundred
pounds of mail and "built to include two passengers."52

3.2 Government Oversight
With names such as Henry Ford, Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, and William A.
Rockefeller leading the way in the promotion of aviation, the new industry was
beginning to take form. "For the first time since Kitty Hawk, American capital
began to flow in substantial amounts into the formation of air transport
companies."53 With the business community willing to risk its own capital,
regulation from the federal government was now imminent. Aviation was
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moving rapidly into the mainstream American transportation system. The need
for airway development and air regulation from the federal government was
urgently required. 54 Consensus, within the aviation community and the United .
States Congress, for developing and regulating this new expanding industry,
did not come easy.
Legislative efforts were difficult in the early years due to lack of public
attention in aviation matters, and delineating between civil and military
aviation became a large obstacle in the initial stages of regulation. Brig. Gen.
Billy Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service, became the most vocal
proponent of aviation becoming an equal department within the military of this
time period. Mitchell claimed that Congress should establish a Department of
Air along with the Department of War and Department of the Navy. Some
believe his critical mistake was insisting that both civil and military aviation
dwell within this new Department of Air.
At the same time, civil aviation enthusiasts strongly believed that the
Department of War and the Department of the Navy should be changed to a
new department with "three separate subdivisions-Army, Navy, and Air."55
They contended that civil aviation must remain in the hands of the civilian
population, not the military. They argued that water transportation was not
under the purview of the Department of Navy, and no one would ever suggest
putting it there. 56 "No fewer than 21 bills and resolutions dealing with aviation
were introduced in the 1st session of the 69th Congress." 57 These debates
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continued in Congressional committees but went unnoticed by most
Americans.
Aviation did not a ffect the daily lives of most Americans at the time;
therefore, Congress was slow to act. Because of this, assorted bills, written
with the intention of helping aviation, failed to ignite decisive debate in the
Congress. "Although the Post Office was making dramatic progress, the state
of aviation as a whole in the United States was chaotic."58 It was the passage of
the Air Commerce Act of 1926, on May 20, that became the cornerstone from
which the aviation industry has grown.
Included in the Air Commerce Act are instructions for the Secretary of
Commerce to,
foster air commerce; designate and establish airways; establish, operate
and maintain aids to air navigation (but not airports); arrange for
research a nd development to improve such a ids; license pilots; issue
airworthiness certificates for a ircraft and major aircraft components; and
investigate accidents. 59
Again, providing airways a nd development of navigational aids was a palatable
form of government subsidies for the electorate. Government's role in airport
development would eventually change as the aviation industry continued to
evolve.

4.0 LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION
The Air Commerce Act of 1926, while the cornerstone of aviation law, was not
without its flaws. "By entrusting to a single agency both promotional and
4'

regulatory powers, [the Air Commerce Act], had created a potential and
permanent source of conflict."60 In addition, by 1929 the national economic
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health along with the growth of the aviation industry was on the decline, "as
passenger traffic as well as mail poundage was decreasing."61 Compelling
needs began to surface indicating the reorganization of the Air Commerce Act
of 1926 was imperative. The Watres Act of April 29, 1930 brought amendments
to the Air Commerce Act that addressed the issues of the United States' ailing
aviation industry.
Fewer people were flying and less mail was moving by air transport. If
aviation was to succeed as a viable form of transportation, government
intervention and control was the obvious solution. The Watres Act brought
changes within the Post Office that allowed for a closer control of air mail
contracts. The Postmaster was given a broader control over the contract
bidding process, among other things. This provided successful air mail
companies the opportunity to discover profits before new fledgling companies
could underbid them and undermine the industry as whole.
While the idea of competitive bidding is essential in the business world, it
was clear the aviation industry could no longer survive in a competitive
marketplace. The large amount of capital that it took the major airlines to
invest initially did not allow for quick profits in this nascent industry,
especially considering commercial aviation was not growing as expected.
Therefore, legislative concessions helped the first few companies become strong
before allowing competitive market forces to take over.

••
Technological advancements in aircraft design were necessary if
passenger travel was to become profitable. Also, a new rate plan, a space-mile
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compensation plan, was borne from the Watres Act that allowed the Post Office
to buy space inside a passenger airline and help subsidize the promotion of
passenger air service. "Air mail payments were unbalanced, allowing some
lines to profit greatly and others to starve."6 2 Previously, airlines contracted to
carry mail and received compensation for the weight of the mail carried
regardless of the distance. The cost of carrying one letter or two thousand
letters was approximately the same for the airline, but the discrepancy in
compensation to the airline for transporting one letter as opposed to 2,000
letters became detrimental to business.
The Watres Act allowed the government to rent the space within aircraft
for a certain cost based on the miles traveled. This gave the airlines a
consistent source of income and promotion of commercial aviation became the
next step in the airlines success. But the unmonitored control in the bidding
process, ultimately led to a cancellation of all mail contracts in 1934 by
President Roosevelt.
Disclosures made by a Senate Investigating Committee revealed that
"competitive bidding had been bypassed and contract awards had been made
as a result of collusion in a series of conferences of operators with Postmaster
General Walter Folger Brown."63 The Air Mail Act of 1934 brought changes to
the previous legislation with regard to the bidding process.

4.1 Growing Pains of Aviation Industry
The inherent conflict of promoting and regulating an industry became all the

.,

more apparent after the fatal crash of New Mexico Senator Bronson Cutting.
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This event, perhaps because it "involved one of their own, convinced many
Congressmen of the importance of separating accident investigation from the
agency responsible for establishing and operating the airways." 64 Along with
the reorganization of safety regulations, it became obvious that improvements
in airway development and accident investigation functions were necessary as
well. In addition, the need for a "federa lly supervised national airport system"
was obvious.65 All of these concerns led to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938.
Because the Air Commerce Act of 1926 had "explicitly prohibited the
Secretary of Commerce from participating in a irport development", relief
program funds, like the Works Progress Administration (WPA), helped some
airport projects during the 1930's. 66 At the same time, new airliners developed
with increased seating capacity, and airline passengers increased from
"475,46 1 passengers in 1932, to 1,365,706 in 1938."67 The introduction of the
Douglas DC-3 forever changed commercia l aviation. Weighing in at 24,000
pounds, this aircraft required at least 3,500 feet of runway for take-off and

,~:•u
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landing. Safely accommodating t his new a ircraft would take "major airport
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improvements."68 By this time, it was clear that the development of an airport
system large enou gh to accommodate the ubiquitous needs of newly designed
aircraft, within this evolving industry, was possible only through federal
assistance.
4!

To handle this new behemoth industry, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
created a "new kind of federal agency."69 As complicated as this burgeoning
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industry was developing, so was the legislation d esigned to handle it. The Civil
Aeronautics Act created a three-headed department called the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA) . Within this authority there laid a triune governing board.
First, the five member entity called the Civil Aeronautics Authority (same
name as entire body), p erformed certain judicial a nd legislative functions
concerning safety and economic regulation. Second in line was the
Administrator of the Authority, acting as an independent entity from the fivemember Authority, the Administrator was responsible for the executive and
operational duties of the agency.?O Last, the Air Safety Board, consisting of
three members, was given certain judicial powers, whose duties included:
investigating accidents, determining cause, and offering recommendations.
The President of the United States appointed all nine members, with the
Administra tor serving at the behest of the President.
Aviation was growing rapidly. By 1939, there were 31,264 priva te pilot
licenses on record, and of that number 8,281 received a license that year.71
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) developed as the voice "loud
enough to be heard" for private pilots and their concerns.72 Certification of
pilots, a ircraft, aircraft mechanics, and aircraft repair stations became
laborious. As an example, within the pilot license certification process there
were six different levels of pilot certification: "student, solo, private, limited
commercial, commercial, and airline transport."73
From its inception, the CAA had personal conflicts among its members,
and an organizational chart that h a d changed four times in less than six
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months.74 By August 22, 1938, the CAA had 2,997 on its payroll, and this
number grew to 3,788 by the end of fiscal 1939.75
Some of the accomplishments of the CAA during this time were the
development of «aircraft radio , aircraft lighting, airport lighting, air traffic
control facilities, instrument landing systems, and more than a dozen other
advances, often in cooperation with private industry." 76 Despite the advances
made by the CAA during this time, criticism arose because of the enormity in
staffing and budgeting for this entity. Nearly 3000 people found employment
with the CAA initially, and their budget funds exceeded $14 million. 77
One of the directives given to the Authority in the Civil Aeronautics Act
was the "encouragement and development of an air transportation system
properly adapted to present and future needs of foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense."78 The significant omission in the Civil Aeronautics Act of prohibiting
federal construction of airports gave the Administrator the new task of
investigating the airport system and recommending the Federal Government's
role in its future development. 79
In Ma rch of 1939, a report presented to Congress on the government's
role in airport development contained three recommendations based on
availability of funds . The report recommended its first program would "provide
for the upgrading of the airmail-stop airports at a cost of $128 million"; a
second program would extend adequate development to 860 airports at a cost
of $230 million"; and ideally the program would «encompass 3,500 airports at a
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cost of $435 million and would furnish an airport within 30 minutes of all
populations centers with more than 5,000 people." 80 The reasoning behind the
recommendations was the improvement of national defense and the air
transport industry; private pilot concerns were never addressed. At the same
time, the CAA recommended that Congress continue to allow WPA funds in
airport projects.
Petitions for funding of airports fell upon deaf ears within the Congress
in 1939, but the CAA was praised for "its realistic recommendation for a
continuation of WPA funding for airport projects."Bl By 1940, events around
the world were changing.

4.2 Reactionary Process of Legislation
Europe was involved in a major conflict, which was supporting airplane
manufacturing in the United States. "Large orders from France and Britain at
the start of the war kept the airline production lines rapidly churning out
planes."82 In 1939, airplanes manufactured in the United States totaled 2, 200
aircraft. This number grew steadily and at the war's peak, in 1944, aircraft
production was at 100,000 aircraft.B3 In June of 1940, President Roosevelt's
Reorganization Plans III and IV went into effect, which divided the Civil
Aeronautics Authority into two organizations. President Roosevelt at this time
reversed his position on a national airport program, "shaken by the fall of
France and the threat to Britain, he called for a large increase in defense
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spending."84

In October 1940, before the United States entered the war,

Congress "appropriated $40 million for the construction, improvement, and
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repair of up to 250 public airports vital to the national defense"; the
Development of Land Areas for National Defense program was borneDLAND.ss
The CAA reorganization in 1940 was an effort to "clarify the relations of
the Civil Aeronautics Authority's Administrator and its five -member board",
known collectively, as the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and an effort to stifle the
growing criticism of the authority.86
The Department of Commerce took over the five-member CAA, and
renamed it, the Civil Aeronautics Board or CAB. The CAB took over the
responsibilities of the former Air Safety Board in this reorganization. The new
assignment for the CAB was "safety rulemaking, adjudication, investigation,
and airline economic regulation", and the CAB reported to the President and
Congress through the Secretary of Commerce. 87
The Administrator position of the CAA fell under the purview of the
Department of Commerce, but the Administrator was to answer directly to the
Secretary of Commerce. The duties of the newly assigned Administrator's
position were the same as those in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Those
were as follows: encouragement of civil aeronautics and commerce,
establishment of civil airways, provision and technical improvement of air
navigation facilities, and the protection and regulation of air traffic
along the airways.ss
Because the Department of Commerce handled ground transportation
along with aviation, a tug-of-war for funds developed between aviation and
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ground transport businesses such as railroads, highway and trucking
interests, and maritime. Entrenched in the business of politics, these well
established ground transport businesses usually received funding first.
By 1941, World War II brought a cooperation that allowed the CAA to
. provide "indispensable services to the Armed Forces while enlarging its own
role."89 The CAA budget during the war saw unprecedented increases due
largely to the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) and the airport program
(DLAND). The CPTP budget grew from $4 million in 1940 to $72 million by
1943, "before the supply of pilots began to catch up to demand."90 Roosevelt
"called for a six year, $560 million, 4,000-airport construction program", but
agreed to a compromise of $40 million to launch the airport program, after an
information leak brought constituents from around the country "clamoring for
a share of the 4,000 airports."91 While these two programs received the lion's
share of appropriations during the war years, it is clear they were essential to
the United States success in World War II.
A post-war prosperity- within the United States saw 25 million passengers
travel domestically and internationally by 1952.92 By 1953, aviation celebrated
fifty years of man in flight, and jet travel became a reality by 1958 introducing
a new dimension to air travel. 93
The CAA was becoming obsolete to those close to the aviation world. The
authority had successfully brought aviation through the war years and
~·

achieved much progress in its tenure. Mandatory flight recorders on all flights
and radar-equipped control towers were two operational procedures initiated by
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the cAA.

But, ((with the first batch of 707's slated for certification and regular

service by year's end and a long list of technical and policy matters left
unresolved, there was the gnawing concern among a irline and airport operators
over jet-age readiness." 94 By 1957, President Eisenhower signed the Airways
Modernization Act, which created an interim agency that was assigned ((the
task of selecting systems, procedures, and devices that would promote
maximum coordination of air traffic control and air defense systems." 95
The following year, President Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 into law. This repealed ((the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, and the Airways Modernization Act of 1957."96 Two
areas of contention in this consolidation of legislation were: military
participation, and safety-rulemaking and accident investigation. The military
question was left unresolved, but the CAB retained the accident investigation
and safety-rulemaking procedures; however, the CAB would now fall under the
jurisdiction of the FAA. 97
The Federal Aviation Agency was established within the Executive
Branch because ((if for no other reason, certain functions were to be vested in
the agency (e.g. airspace allocation) that affected national defense and therefore
required the President to be in a position to exercise his constitutional
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief."98 Six areas required immediate
attention within the aviation industry. They were as follows:
Plans to segregate military jet and civil aircraft operations should be
accelerated; cockpit visibility standards should be revised; r estricted
areas of airspace s h ould be reevaluated; airport runway-length standards
should be established to accommodate jet operations; a irport planning,
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communication with airport operators should be improved; and
inequities in air traffic controller job standards should be corrected.99
While the FAA was creating their strategic plan for aviation, security was to
become one of the largest concerns the organization would face in its overall
plan.
5.0 FOCUS ON SECURITY

The Federal Aviation Agency became the Federal Aviation Administration on
October 15, 1966, during the Johnson administration, when the Department of
Transportation Act (DOT Act) brought "31 previously scattered Federal
elements, including FAA, under the wing of one Cabinet Department."lOO With
regard to safety, the DOT Act created the five-member National Transportation
Safety Board, or NTSB, located within the Department of Transportation.
Passage of this law, transferred safety responsibilities from the CAB to the new
NTSB; however, security issues would become one of the preeminent concerns
for this new Federal Aviation Administration.
Back on May 16, 1962, the Federal Aviation Agency formally established
a new Office of Compliance and Security. The formation of this new office was
a response to the first in a series of hijackings that began on May 1, 1961,
when "a passenger on a flight to Key West, Fla. forced the pilot to fly to
Cuba." 101 In August of 1961, "the federal government employed armed guards
on civilian planes" in an effort to deter air piracy.102 These armed marshals
performed their duties only when called upon by the airlines.
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Hijackings continued and by 1968 "a total of twelve airliners and six
general aviation aircraft were diverted to Cuba."l03 In response the FAA
announced that "sky marshals", specially trained safety inspectors for the FAA,
would be aboard all Florida bound flights.l0 4 This specially trained sky
marshal program would eventually morph into the Federal Air Marshall
Program. The FAA realized early that sky marshals were not the panacea for
aviation security, and in February of 1972, the FAA published "a rule requiring
scheduled air carriers and certain commercial operators of large aircraft to
implement a passenger and baggage screening system" acceptable to the
Administrator before February 6, 1972." 105 President Nixon, in March of 1972
after three sabotage efforts against U.S. airliners in New York City, Las Vegas,
and Seattle failed, gave a directive for immediate implementation of FAA's rule.
In December 1972, a
landmark FAA antihijacking emergency rule ... required U.S. air carriers,
beginning on January 5, 1973, to inspect all carry-on baggage for
weapons or other dangerous objects and scan each passenger with a
metal detector (magnetometer) before boarding or, if a detector was not
available, conduct a physical search, or pat down. I06
Permission to board all aircraft was contingent on passenger compliance with
this new rule.
Within a few years, the Transportation Safety Act of 1974 finally
separated the NTSB from the Department of Transportation. "Congress
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declared that the NTSB could not properly conduct its responsibility of
IIIH

determining the probable cause of transportation accidents without total
separation and independence."l07 NTSB received jurisdiction in accident
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investigation along with determining probable cause. Recommendations from
NTSB would work in preventing similar accidents. The results of this
organizational evolution in aviation safety continue today.
Aviation security was a different story. Despite all the security
enforcement of the FAA a nd the airlines, by 1978, hijackings reached a record
number. The profile of the air pirate was constantly changing, and in 1988 an
explosion of an airliner caused yet another mandatory security measure to go
into effect. All U.S. airlines at European and Middle Eastern airports required
all baggage to be x-rayed or physically searched before placing them on the
aircraft. Also, baggage and passengers had to match, so that no unclaimed bag
would find its way onto an aircraft. 108 In January 1989, the FAA required
airport operators to limit access to secure areas by installing a computer
controlled access system, whereby only personnel with badges may gain entry
into secured areas.l09 In addition, the EDT, or explosives detection systems,
became the standard mandated by the FAA for the airlines implementation.
Since 1958 the security of aviation in the United States resided with the
Federal Aviation Administration. In its mandate, FAA received two divergent
goals: promotion of aviation and public safety through regulations. The fact is
that Congress n ever "gave any parameters to the FAA to help the agency
recognize where the line of promotion ended and where the line of regulation
began"; this could explain the unsuccessful security objectives of the Federal
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Aviation Administration.11°. With the creation of the Department of Homeland
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Security, in answer to the most heinous acts to date used against the aviation
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industry, oversight of the nation's aviation security has been established with
the Transportation Security Administration specifically charged with
transportation security issues.

s.l Department of Homeland Security
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001 and
placed it under the umbrella of the Department of Transportation.
Since the late 1960's and early 1970's when passenger screening was
first initiated, increasing and improving aviation security has been a
learning experience. Each incremental increase in security was usually
the result of some catastrophic event, the most recent being the
September 11, 2001, attack.lll
Approximately one year after those attacks, Congress gave birth to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the Department of Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and placed the TSA within this new department. The
mission of the D HS is as follows:
We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent
and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats
and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders,
welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of
commerce.ll2
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Tom Ridge,
recently spoke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, which is the panel investigating the September 11th attacks. In
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his speech, he outlined the initiatives and programs that have begun across
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the country, and the unified cooperation among government agencies at all
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levels that is ensuring the free flow of information from one agency to another.
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In addition, technologies are developing specifically designed to help thwart
further terrorist attacks. One program called US-Visit "is using biometrics to
speed the entry of foreign travelers-4 million passengers have been processed
to date-and stop criminals, more than 400 have been apprehended or
prevented from entering the country."ll3
Before 9 I 11, airline ticket agents asked the cursory question of who
packed a passenger's bags. But the DHS has "deployed newly trained
screeners and thousands of Federal Air Marshals, hardened cockpit doors on
aircraft, and introduced state-of-the-art technologies, which, from the curb to
the cockpit, have made airline travel safer."ll4
It appears, at least on the surface, that this newly formed department is

working diligently in its efforts to reduce the security vulnerabilities within the
United States' aviation system. The DHS is not only concerned with aviation
security matters, but also includes the security concems of "thousands of
miles of borders, shoreline, highways, railways, and waterways" within the
United States borders.ll5 The following agencies exist within the Department
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of Homeland Security: U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Federal Protective Service, Transportation Security Administration,
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness. 11 6
George W. Bush, as President of the United States, transferred the
A

responsibilities of aviation security from the Department of Transportation to
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the Department of Homeland Security, when h e signed the Aviation and
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Transportation Security Act of 2002. Most of those security responsibilities
presently reside with the Transportation Security Administration.

5.2 Transportation Security Administration
The TSA has the task of implementing and managing the federalization of
passenger screening for over 440 airports, a task formerly assigned to the
airlines through private security contractors. The TSA implementation of
federal screeners

consist~

of "conducting passenger and baggage screening,

and overseeing security measures for airports, commercial aircraft, air cargo,
and general aviation."ll7
Within its first year, the TSA was responsible for meeting the ambitious
deadlines for federalization of screeners by November 2002, dealt to them by
the Congress and the President of the United States. While "establishing a new
federal agency from the ground up" , the TSA federalized their passenger
screening force. us
Focus of the TSA's resources and objectives over the last few years has
been aviation concerns; even though, its creation was to oversee the security of
all transportation modes within the United States. In its 2 005 budget, the TSA
included $5 .3 billion for aviation security and $146 million for all other
transportation modes-rail, ports, pipelines, and mass transit.Il9 At a May 12,
2004, Homeland Security Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
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h earing, Representative Christopher Cox of California questioned "the degree to
'111

which TSA should exercise authority beyond aviation security."l20 This uneven
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distribution of funding has some within the transportation community
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wondering if perhaps aviation security should become a separate de partn1e n t
within the De partment of Homeland Security.

6.0 FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Threats of terrorism within the aviation have brought major challenges to this
industry. In the infancy of aviation, safety was the paramount concern.
Ensuring public safety created volumes of regulations and laborious
procedures and certification processes. The industry reacted with additional
legislat ion and regulations with the appearance of the hijacker, or sky pirate.
No one could have ever predicted that the sky pirate would evolve into the
suicidal terrorist that the world faces today in aviation. This evolution reveals
that no longer does the hijacker pirate the aircraft with an illegal weapon,
threatening harm or death to anyone that does not cooperate, but rather, the
profile of today's hijacker is one that uses the aircraft as its weapon with no
regard for life, not even his own. Ensuring security with such an onerous foe is
the plight of aviation today . The reactive measures of legislation, which have
guided Congress over the last century in its effort to regulate aviation, continue
with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Like aviation safety
with the NTSB, aviation security now resides within its own agency, t he DHS.

I

6.1 Cost and Effectiveness
Within months of the catastrophic events of September 11th, 2001, the FY 2001
President's Budget Request reported , under the Federal Aviation budget line,
an $11.222 billion request, which was an increase of $1,28 1 million from the
previous year. The request included funds for expenses in operations (59%),
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Grant-In-Aid to airports (17%), Facilities and Equipment (22%), and Research,
Engineering, and Development (2% .) The budget numbers reflect the immense
task of providing the nation's aviation industry with security and safety, and
even with this monstrous budget, vulnerabilities still exist.
Security within the aviation industry has historically contained longstanding vulnerabilities. These included improper screening of passengers,
which allowed for threats to the overall security system, lack of screening of
checked baggage on domestic flights , securing access at airports, and
inadequate security measures for air traffic control computer systems and
facilities.l 21
The United States Government Accounting Office issued a report in 1998
entitled AVIATION SAFETY Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit

FAA in identifying and Responding to Risks. The report was a response to the
public for "better government oversight of aviation safety and security'', a nd the
Congress' questions focused on FAA inspectors, their training, the use of
resources within the inspection program, and enforcement of inspection
violations.l22 Under the heading of purpose, the report states that t he FAA
"regulates and monitors the safety and security of air transportation and air
commerce, an effort supported by the aviation industry through training and
self-monitoring programs."l23
With the safety and security programs of the FAA providing for "initial
a·•

certification, periodic surveillance, and inspection of airlines, airports, repair
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stations, and other aviation entities, as well as of pilots and mechanics", FAA's
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inspections served an integral role in identifying potential weaknesses and
vulnerabilities within aviation safety and security .12-l The 1998 report stated
that "FAA's information on compliance in the aviation industry is[ .. .]
incomplete and of limited use in providing early warning of potential risks and
targeting inspection resources to the greatest risks."l25
In January 2001, the FAA issued its Strategic Plan, which contained
three areas of focus: safety, security, and system efficiency. Within the
security area, the following strategies were listed: Improve security baseline
and Implement information systems security program. 126 The plan outlined
the improved security baseline as the New Security Baseline and defined it as
establishing " .. .a solid baseline level of security at airports throughout the
Nation, then to address risks and vulnerabilities that remain." 127
According to a March 2004 GAO report, many efforts have been made to
improve aviation security, "but as we and others have documented in
numerous reports and studies, weaknesses in the system continue to exist. It
was these weaknesses that terrorists exploited to hijack four commercial

n il

a ircraft in September 2001, with tragic results.l 28
While the GAO called FAA's inspection and compliance process into
question its February 1998 report, it also states that "the aviation community
shares the responsibility for ensuring aviation safety and security."l29 The fact
is that many airlines, repair stations, and aviation companies have their own
r1

monitoring systems that allow for the highest quality of safety and security and
these programs foster[ed] compliance with FAA regulations. l30

"

Piccolo 39
Is TSA fairing any better than the FAA in its efforts to afford security in
the aviation industry? Recently, the Government Accounting Office issued the
results of its study on the performance of TSA in a report dated March 30,
2004. The GAO found major deficiencies in the efforts of TSA and its overall
plan for ensuring future aviation security. "Challenges continue to face the
Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration efforts to improve aviation security."l31
The March 2004 report entitled, AVIATION SECURITY Improvement Still

Needed In Federal Aviation Security Efforts, found that despite the designed
aviation security changes Congress initiated with their legislative efforts, the
security condition within the United States aviation industry is still in need of
improvement and strengthening. The study revealed four major ongoing efforts
within the TSA. They are as follows:

(
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1. CAPPS II- Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System is

developing to "help identify high-risk passengers prior to arriving at the
airport."l32

Major progress in this system has stalled. Because of privacy concerns, TSA is
unable to secure passenger information from airlines that will allow for testing
and development of this new system. While Congress identified eight issues "as
key areas of interest related to the development, operation, and public
acceptance of CAPPS II", at this time, TSA has insufficiently addressed seven of
those eight issues.l33 Additionally, three major elements remain unexplored-
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"international cooperation, program mission expansion, and identity theftthat could prevent the successful implementation of CAPPS II if not adequately
resolved by TSA."l34

2. Management by TSA of Passenger/Baggage Screeners- The
government mandated a federal screener workforce by November of 2002.
While the TSA met this mandate, it "continues to face challenges in
hiring, deploying, and training its screener workforce." 135
Before September 11th, Congress and the public questioned the effectiveness
and accuracy of passenger screening by the airlines, as evidenced by the GAO
report of February 1998 entitled AVIATION SAFETY Weaknesses in Inspection

I

and Enforcement Limit. But the events of September 11th, with the creation of
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the Transportation Security Administration brought a federal presence to

I

aviation passenger and baggage screening. While meeting the mandate of a
federal screening program with a November 2002 deadline, the TSA continues
to struggle in its efforts toward an effective workforce. The GAO report found
four areas where TSA needs improvement in its efforts to: "hire and d eploy
passenger and baggage screeners, train the screening workforce, measure
screener performance in detecting threat objects, a nd leverage and deploy
screening equipment and technologies."l36
Staffing problems within the TSA have created imbalances within
aviation's overall security system. This has resulted in some airports having
too many screeners while other airports have screener shortages. Current
staffing levels fall far below the Congressional imposed cap of 45,000 full-time
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screeners with annual attrition rates averaging approximately 14 percent.
Attracting new employees both full-time and part-time is difficult because
federal standards are in place to make hiring practices ctstandardized and
consistent throughout all airports." 13 7 This process had made it difficult for the
local Federal Security Directors (FSD) at airports to staff the checkpoints for
passenger and baggage screeners. With every airport having different peak
travel times and variables in overall air service, it is ineffective and inefficient to
assess each airport's staffing needs the same.
TSA hired a consultant firm, Bearing Point, to study the staffing problems
within its department. The study, Private Screening Operations Performance

Evaluation Report, dated April 16, 2004 evaluated "the five commercial airports
that retained private screening personnel under Transportation Security
Administration oversight after the federalization of the nation's screening
workforce in 2002."138 The five airports utilizing private screening companies
are as follows: San Francisco International (California), Kansas City (Missouri),
Greater Rochester International (New York), Jackson Hole (Wyoming), and
Tupelo Regional (Mississippi.) The findings indicate that the degrees of
freedom within the Private Pilot Program "offered some latitude in their
implementation of security screening

operations." 139

Strengths in the Federal Screening Model were found as follows: fewer
layers of management, roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, direct
control of screening resources (staffing, scheduling, _employee behavior and
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attendance), communication with stakeholders, and the ability to shift
resources within the hub/ spoke system.140
Strengths within the Private Screening Model include the items below:
faster decision making processes, more efficient employee discipline and
termination process, more flexibility in scheduling screeners, more efficient use
of personnel, additional compensation opportunities, cost innovations, FSD can
act as an objective observer when dealing with stakeholders (airport
management or airlines) complaints about screening operations, and more
visibility of operational performance (screeners observed closer due to award
fee criteria in contracts.)141
TSA is "trying to compensate for screener shortages and to enable
operational flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat."1 42 By creating
the National Screener Force in October 2003, TSA has over 700 full-time
passenger and baggage screeners available to airport FSD's for emergencies,
seasonal demands, and other special circumstances on a priority basis. "The
highest priority is given to those airports that need additional screeners in
order to be able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detec tion (ETD) systems."143
TSA continues to examine this program for its effectiveness in addressing some
of its staffing issues.l44
Training programs within TSA face some of the same staffing challenges
that are experienced by the Passenger and Baggage Screening Workforce.
Training includes the following elements: training all screeners in the skills
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necessary for both passenger and baggage screening; recurrent screener
training; and technical screener training/ certification for EDS. 145 Because of
staffing problems and "lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training
facilities", the above-mentioned training programs have been less than
successful.

3. Federal Air Marshal Service- Operational and management
problems have hindered the expansion of this program.
Advanced training has created increased costs, and budget cutbacks "have
delayed expected completion of this training by all air marshals until mid2004."146 Employment of air marshals has not reached the target levels and
indications are that the numbers are actually declining. Facilities for field
operations and equipment are not available and management of scheduling
and missions of the Air Marshall Program are delayed.l4 7

4. New threats for DHS/TSA- "Shoulder-launched surface to air
missiles (MANPADS), improving airport perimeter and access controls,
and addressing broad security concern related to air cargo and general
aviation."l48
Major challenges lie ahead for DHS/TSA in developing counter-measures
against the use of MANPADS in aviation. "In 2002, terrorists fired surface-toair missiles at an airliner departing from an airport in Kenya, marking the first
time they had been used to attack commercial aircraft in a non-combat
zone."l49
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6.2 Weaknesses
Air Cargo Security requires monitoring " 12 .5 million tons of cargo each
year."lSO Of this amount, 9.7 million tons travel on all-cargo planes and 2.8
million tons on passenger planes." 151 The possibility of "undetected explosives
or incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft" requires that TSA develop
a system to "screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of cargo" in
aviation. 1s2 At this time, TSA's method of "ensuring air cargo security and
safety is to ensure compliance with the "known shipper" program. 153 This
program allows t hose companies with established histories in the freight
business cleared access to shipping privileges. Tampering of freight at various
stations in the shipping process is a major weakness in this program.
TSA is focusing on the weaknesses within the general aviation industry.
A much needed security plan to secure and guide the general aviation
population requires development and implementation. At this time, general
aviation pilots and passengers are not screen ed before they take-off nor are the
contents of their a ircr aft. At more than 19,000 airports around the country,
there are over 200,000 privately owned aircraft. Reports of more than 70
stolen aircraft, over the last five years, reveals a vulnerability that terrorists

I

could exploit. l54 "In January 2002, when a teenage flight student stole and
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crashed a single-engine airplane into a Tampa, Florida, skyscraper" , this

I

vulnerability became more apparent.1ss

I

To help with their efforts in establishing security requirements within
general aviation, TSA has established a working group of industry stakeholders
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to work within their existing Aviation Security Advisory Committee. The
group's objective was identifying and recommending "actions to close potential
security gaps in general aviation." 156 A report, in October 2003, included
"recommendations for general aviation airport operator's voluntary use in
evaluating airports' security requirements." IS? TSA plans to use these
recommendations as a baseline for specific "federally endorsed guidelines" in
general aviation.l58
Finally, in order for TSA's effective implementation of its overall
operations plan, expensive equipment and technologies are required. While,
TSA deployed Explosive Detection Systems and Explosive Trace Detection
machines to all its airports, personnel shortages, and equipment shortages and
repairs have prevented TSA from screening 100 percent of passengers and
baggage by the Congressional mandated deadline of December 31, 2003 .159
"TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but
continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all checked
baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by ATSA."l60
According the United States Office of Management and Budget, the Fiscal
Year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security is $40.2
billion, which is a 10% increase over FY 2004. Of the $40 .2 billion budget, an
allocation of $33.9 billion is discretionary funding. Of the monies budgeted for
DHS in the 2005 Budget, the TSA will receive $5.3 billion. The funds will help
to continue to
improve the quality and efficiency of screening operations through a
combination of additional screener training, stronger management
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controls of screener performance, and technology automation. The
Budget also provides $400 million to continue deploying more efficient
baggage screening solutions at our Nation's busiest airports to improve
security while increasing operational efficiency.161
Funding issues regarding transportation security issues have necessitated the
formation of a list of criteria used by the federal government for funding
priorities. The criteria are as follows: ridership levels, populations, identified
vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets. These criteria point directly at the
aviation industry at this time.
Because aviation has a high level of ridership, and most airports lie in
population centers, with airlines and aviation vulnerabilities now obvious, and
aviation infrastructure assets critical to the nation's economy, it is reasonable
to assume that aviation will have the most funding and oversight dedicated to
ensuring its security.

6.3 Liberty Infringements
Ensuring security in the United States today exposes us all to a greater degree
of scrutiny in affording us the safety and security that we demand from our
government. While use of public transportation modes is not a civil right for
citizens of the United States, legitimate privacy issues remain undecided.
Privacy issues concerning database searches, search and seizure of baggage,
and profiling are currently on the forefront of civil liberty infringements within
the federal government's efforts toward securing national security in aviation.
The American Civil Liberties Union has several cases on file within the courts
at this time regarding the above-mentioned liberty infringements.
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While the Fourth Amendment states that privacy "protects people, not
places", the analysis of the Amendment is centered on the "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy."162 The Fourth Amendment does
not protect subjective expectations of privacy , but only "those expectations that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."163 Since we live in a world
plagued with terrorist threats, it is reasonable to assume that we are all
considered suspect when traveling within the public transportation system. To
what level of intrusion into our privacy we can expect as reasonable has not yet
been determined by the courts.
For example, the ASSR, Avia tion Security Screening Records, is a
database under consideration by the Department of Transportation that would
include "sensitive personal information about financial data (e.g. credit card
transactions), transactional data (e.g. any electronic purchase or service), and
the full range of "proprietary'' and "public source" information available in
government and private industry databases about an untold number of airline
passengers traveling inside the United States." 164 These new informationsharing databases, created to provide safeguards toward security, will create
new challenges in security for federal agencies. The recent Federal Information
Security Management Act of 2002 charges "federal agencies to provide
information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of
harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on
behalf of the agency."165
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7.0 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, one can observe from this analysis that the more technologically
advanced a civilization becomes, the more regulation it needs to safeguard it;
however, at the same time, the more regula tions it creates, the more
bureaucracy and infrastructure it needs to implement those regulations.
Thomas Hobbes reasonably presented us with his argument supporting
government over the state of nature in his essay, Leviathan, but George Orwell
warned his readers that citizens within a government are responsible for
monitoring and restraining the Leviathan of government from its ambitious
nature. The idea of a federal information database can vividly be viewed as a
slippery slope toward the Big Brother government described by Orwell in his
novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four. This slippery slope of progress in providing
security through technology increases the possibility of Orwell's visions, and
could explain the novel's longevity.
The history of aviation regulation strongly suggests that more intrusion
into our private lives is most likely imminent with the recent events of
September 11th. Aviation agencies historically react to crises by increasing
their size and scope of responsibility. This historical trend indicates that
government intervention in our lives is likely to become increasingly invasive.
Simply stated, the more regulations we impose on ourselves, the more liberties
or privacy we can expect to give up. It is the degree of intrusion into our
privacy, which we are collectively willing to accept, that will determine our
future liberties.
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